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uncertainties are inherent to the specific problem domain which
is being modeled with many underlying assumptions based on
a prior knowledge from the previously known phenomena. In
order to achieve probabilistic risk assessment for effective
decision making, the nature of uncertainty in risk assessment
must be carefully identified, expressed, propagated,
synthesized and understood. From the risk assessment
perspective, uncertainties are originated from various sources:

Abstract — Risk assessment is a critical decision making

process during the Security Certification and
Accreditation (C&A) process. However, existing
infrastructure-wide C&A processes in real world are
challenged by the ever increasing complexity of
information systems and their diverse socio-technical
operational environments. The lack of an explicit model
and the associated uncertainties of software behavior are
two main reasons that directly impact the effectiveness of
risk assessment as well as the subjective decisions made
based on the different level of domain expertise. In this
paper, we propose a method for a probabilistic modeldriven risk assessment on security requirements. The
security requirements and their causal relationships are
represented using MEBN (Multi-Entities Bayesian
Networks) logic that constructs an explicit formal risk
assessment model that supports evidence-driven
arguments. The proposed approach is described by using
real-world C&A scenarios to show not only its feasibility
for security requirements risk assessment but also its
effectiveness for the sensitivity analysis to identify critical
influences among information entities in a complex and
uncertain operational environment.

• Consistency and completeness of the information and its
validity: We often use different types of historic data,
questionnaires results, etc. to support our claim, however, the
coverage and effectiveness of the sources of the information
are yet to be perfect to the given situation.
• Assumptions behind the model: Risk assessment process is
based on the models of the relationships among different risk
factors with assumptions that are very unique and specific to
the situation which are hard to be treated in general.
• Dynamics of the environment: The constantly changing
systems’ operational environments are different to one
another and the risks of the target system are always
expected to have new factors to be considered based on the
changes being made (or those that will be made).
• Subjective nature of human expertise and judgment: The
level of human expertise on a certain subject, often becomes
the main resource for risk assessment, for each individual is
different and lack the ability to effectively communicate to
converge into the final decision making points.

Keywords – Probabilistic risk assessment, Security requirements,
Bayesian network, Certification, Accreditation, Sensitivity analysis

I.

INTRODUCTION

The government, defense, and private sectors spend billions
of dollars every year in securing software systems that support
their critical businesses/missions. According to a recent survey,
among 1,300 global companies, and government and non-profit
agencies in 55 nations, the compliance with regulations has
taken the lead as the primary driver of security efforts in an
organization, surpassing worms and viruses. However, various
reports [8] [11] [31] indicate that the process of measuring
compliance with security Certification & Accreditation (C&A)
requirements is often irregular and unreliable. As a result, C&A
processes lack consistent, complete and measurable outcomes
and fail to provide adequate and timely information to
understand security risks and make informed decisions.

Risk assessment is a process of identifying relevant
information resources (risk factors), discovering their
relationships, and integrating them to form a risk assessment
argument. In regards to the uncertainties, we must address four
issues: 1) how the uncertainty of information should be
understood and expressed (for problem understanding); 2) how
different pieces of information are integrated (to build a causal
model); 3) how new information can be incorporated (for
model evolution); and 4) what if the operational situation is
changed (for the changing risk factors and their adaptation).
During the process of risk assessment, experts can make not
only judgments, but also meta-judgments [13], that is,
judgments about the degree of certainty that they have in their
judgments. Since the judgments can be precisely modeled
through an appropriate probability distribution, we, therefore,
use the probability theory to express uncertainties in the
domain of risk assessment. In addition, we notice that the

Due to the ever increasing complexity of information
systems and their diverse socio-technical operational
environments, the associated risk assessment processes need to
handle various types of uncertainties of the information. These
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the system reliability that predicts human and machine
reliabilities with given input variables representing the scenario
and ranges of environmental conditions. Fenton and Maiden
[15] and Neil et al. [30] have developed large BBN models to
assess risk at the system level, such as the reliability of system
engineering processes for developing ships, vehicles, or the
operational reliability of air traffic control systems. Fenton [14]
indicated that BBN is the most effective model in software
quality management through comparison with six other types
of methods. Hui, et al. [22] also introduced a method to build a
BBN for software risk assessment. But these BBN approaches
are limited since the number of nodes and structures of their
models are fixed and therefore, can only be used in a certain
specific situation. When the given situation changes, the model
needs to be modified manually to fit the new situation, even
these changes are simply to add some repeated nodes or
substructures. This is partly because standard BBN lacks the
sufficient expressive power.

experts can do better in making judgments at a lower level, or
at a more observable level (e.g. the configuration correctness of
a certain countermeasure) but less effective at a higher level
(e.g. the level of risk of the entire system). This is because, at a
higher level, making a decision requires a more complex
process to integrate or synthesize different information coming
from lower levels, especially when there are hundreds of or
even thousands of risk factors involved in the inspecting
systems (or network of systems). Therefore, we use the
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) that provides a theoretical
foundation to incorporate such accumulated evidences. Also,
we propose a way to make our probabilistic risk assessment
model parametric, so that the risk assessment model can be
parameterized or instantiated automatically, instead of building
a new model, whenever the operational situation is changed.
In this paper, as an application example, we focus on the
Department of Defense Information Technology Security C&A
Process (DITSCAP) that defines certification as a
comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-technical
security features of an information system and other safeguards
made in support of the accreditation process, to establish the
extent to which a particular design and implementation meets a
set of specified security requirements [2].
II.

To address this limitation, a number of languages have been
developed that represent probabilistic knowledge as modular
units with repeated substructures that can be composed into
complex domain models [24]. These include pattern theory
[20], hidden Markov models [10], the plates language
implemented in BUGS [18], Object-Oriented Bayesian
networks (OOBN) [23], probabilistic relational models (PRMs)
[17], and MEBN [24]. In contrast, MEBN provides a more
flexible, coherent way to facilitate representation of knowledge
at a natural level of granularity. It combines the expressive
power of first-order logic with a sound and logically consistent
treatment of BBN. MEBN fragments (MFrags) are parametric
causal fragments and can be instantiated and combined to form
arbitrarily complex graphical probability model. A feature of
MEBN not present in PRMs, plates or OOBNs is the use of
context constraints to specify logical conditions that determine
whether one random variable influences another.

RELATED WORK

Several risk assessment tools and approaches are proposed
in order to determine threats/vulnerabilities in the early phase
of software development life cycle. CORAS [5] and RiskManagement Framework [32] propose their own
methodological steps, but lack specific guidelines to
interoperate with C&A activities and appropriately utilize the
evidences gathered for C&A requirements into the risk
assessment process.
Several quantitative risk assessment methods exist. Butler
[6] proposes a SAEM method which is a cost-benefit analysis
process for analyzing security design decisions based on the
comparison of a “threat index”. However, it is based on some
impractical assumptions. Ekelhart [9] uses security ontology to
improve quantitative risk analysis and promote the common
understanding of the involved risk factors. However, it is not
sufficient to identify how these risk factors can contribute to
the entire risk assessment process. Quantitative risk-based
requirements reasoning in [12] uses PACT as a “filter”
arranged in series to find out a proportion of likelihood or the
impact of risk factor. However, it lacks the ability to represent
the impacts among multiple risk factors. The SSRAM model in
[28] provides a prioritization that aids in determining how the
risks identified will be addressed in different phases of
software development. However, it lacks a baseline for
systematically identifying potential risks and reasoning about
their relationships and interactions in a real operational
environment.

BACKGROUND

III.

A. Modeling C&A Requirements and Risk Components
To systematically identify and reason about the risk
components expressed in natural language C&A security
requirements descriptions, we extend the Common Criteria
security model [1]. The resulting model in Figure 1, explains
the relationships between security requirements and risk
components.
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CR
EA

SE

1..*

*

COUNTER
MEASURES

MITIGATES
*

*

HAVE

LEAD TO

1..*

VULNERABILITIES

ST

*
1..*

*

1..*

THREATS

MISSION
CRITICALITY

*

PREVENT

DAMAGE
1..*

1

HAVE

*

ASSETS

1..*

C
DU
RE

E

1..*

HAVE

*

RISKS

*

Figure 1. Requirements and Risk Model [16]

The risk components and their correlations in the
Requirements and Risk Model (hereinafter called the Risk
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Model) can be simply described as: the assets have mission
criticalities and risks, threats can exploit the vulnerabilities to
damage the assets thus increase their risks. The security
requirements driven by threats suggest countermeasures to
mitigate the vulnerabilities thus prevent the vulnerabilities and
reduce the risks, whilst countermeasures may also introduce
vulnerabilities which can lead to risks. The final goal is to
evaluate the risk of assets in a given situation.

Model, but also their properties related to risk assessment, e.g.,
the maintenance of countermeasure etc.), therefore, we propose
to model the risk assessment by using Bayesian probability to
perform the probabilistic risk assessment.
A. Motivations and Benefits
In a security C&A process, our probabilistic risk
assessment is motivated by the following needs to: 1) Make the
process of risk assessment more explicit and systematic to
support better decisions under uncertainty; 2) Make risk
assessment techniques be based on probabilistic metrics that
can be evaluated systematically with little involvement of
subjective measures from domain experts [34]; 3) Classify the
relevant risk components and map their causal relationships to
concepts in the domain-specific taxonomies of threats, assets,
vulnerabilities, and countermeasures modeled in the PDO; 4)
Use BBN to represent and model uncertainty among
dependability requirements in C&A process then, analyze
causal relationships and impacts qualitatively and
quantitatively among different risk components; and 5)
Automatically generate BBN according to the given risk
assessment scenarios.

Based on the model in Figure 1, domain experts identify the
relevant risk components and map them into the concepts in the
domain-specific taxonomies of threats, assets, vulnerabilities,
and countermeasures modeled in the Problem Domain
Ontology (PDO) [25]. For example, Figure 2 shows the
explication of multi-dimensional domain concepts for the
DITSCAP “Boundary Defense” requirement [3].
REQUIREMENT:
ACQUISITION
STANDARDS
(REQUIREMENTS
CROSS-REFERENCE)

C&A PROCESS GOAL:
DEFINE SYSTEM
INTERFACES
(DOMAIN EXPERTISE)

VIEWPOINT:
ADMINISTRATOR
(STAKEHOLDER
RESPONSIBILITY)

Name: Boundary Defense
VULNERABILITY:
USE OF
TAMPERED SOFTWARE
(RELATED
REQUIREMENT)

REQUIREMENT:
OUTSOURCED
APPLICATION SUBJECT
TO DoD ENCLAVE
BOUNDARY DEFENSE
(REQUIREMENTS
CROSS-REFERENCE)

THREAT:
UNAUTHORIZED
INTERNET ACCESS
(DOMAIN
EXPERTISE)

THREAT:
UNAUTHORIZED
NETWORK TRAFFIC
(DOMAIN
EXPERTISE)

Information Assurance
Service: Confidentiality
Description: Boundary defense
mechanisms to include firewalls
and network intrusion detection
systems (IDS) are deployed at
the enclave boundary to the wide
area network, at layered or
internal enclave boundaries and
at key points in the network, as
required. All Internet access is
proxied through Internet access
points that are under the
management and control of the
enclave and are isolated from
other DoD information systems
by physical or technical means.
ASSET:
ENCLAVE
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)

VIEWPOINT:
CONFIDENTIALITY
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
COUNTERMEASURE:
INSTALL FIREWALLS & IDS
AT KEY POINTS IN THE
ENCLAVE WITH APPROPRIATE
CONFIGURATIONS
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
VULNERABILITY:
FIREWALL AND IDS
MIS-CONFIGURATION
(RELATED
COUNTERMEASURE)

Also, our probabilistic risk assessment approach has the
following benefits: 1) Different stakeholders can have an
explicit and common understanding of the risk assessment
process and the decision rationale; 2) Every phase of risk
assessment process is arguable and can be re-evaluated based
on the common understanding; and 3) Simulation is possible
through sensitivity analysis to show how different risk
components are related to and impacted by each other.

COUNTERMEASURE:
MANAGED INTERNET
ACCESS CONTROL
POINTS (DMZ)
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)
VULNERABILITY:
INTERNET ACCESS NOT
PROXIED
(RELATED
COUNTERMEASURE)

ASSET:
DoD INFORMATION
SYSTEM
(KEYWORD ANALYSIS)

B. Bayesian Network for Risk Assessment
In risk assessment, BBN can provide stakeholders a causal
relationship graph and inference capabilities among different
risk components. Before building the BBN for risk assessment,
it is worth giving a brief definition for the risk components
discussed in our domain (adapted from [4]).

Figure 2. Analyzing a DITSCAP Requirement

IV.

PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS

 C&A requirement is the specification that describes the
security conditions and constraints under which the system
must be operated.
 Mission criticality is related to asset, representing relative
importance of the asset to the mission success.
 Asset is the resource of the system that needs to be protected
to achieve its goal
 Threat is a potential danger to the system such as a person,
system component or event that might result in a
compromise of the secure operation of the system.
 Vulnerability is a weakness in the system or a point where a
system is susceptible to attack. This weakness could be
exploited to violate the system security.
 Countermeasure is an action, device, procedure or technique
for protecting the system against threats to its secure
operation.
 Risk is the asset-based risk, it presents the risk extent of an
asset can impact on the whole system.

In the Requirements and Risk Model shown in Figure 1, we
can identify two types of links, the Information Discovery Link,
and the Causal Relationship Link. The former has been used to
discover and understand multi-dimensional correlations among
C&A requirements [16] as shown in Figure 2. The latter, we
believe, is helpful to extract the causal relationships and reason
about their impacts within the process of risk assessment.
The domain of risk assessment is full of uncertainties and
effective decisions must be made to answer questions, for
example, “How likely a certain threat will occur?” or “How
effective a countermeasure can mitigate certain vulnerability?”
etc. As mentioned in section II, BBNs have been widely
applied as a probabilistic reasoning technique in software
engineering and other domains. BBNs allow the construction of
probabilistic models involving large numbers of interrelated
uncertain hypotheses and have the ability to combine
qualitative expert knowledge with quantitative measures of
plausibility and statistical data. In Figure 1, the risk is causally
related to a certain set of security requirements, threats,
vulnerabilities, countermeasures and other risk factors (here
risk factors represent not only the risk components in the Risk
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 Definitional/synthesis idiom: This idiom can be used to
represent definitional relationships such as X=Y/Z. Synthetic
nodes can ease calculation or understanding, and create
hierarchies of sub-attributes to define complex super
attributes.

We extract the causal relationship and construct the BBN
based on the Risk Model in Figure 1. Building a BBN to model
the risk assessment process requires a thorough enumeration of
all the relevant risk factors and knowing correctly which risk
factor causally influences other factors. For a complex sociotechnical system, it is very difficult to produce precise network
structure and Node Probability Tables (NPTs) for hundreds of
or even thousands of risk factors. In addition, different people
have different experiences and understanding; the building
process may be very subjective. In order to make our BBN
reliable and justifiable, we adopt an objective and formal way
to capture the process knowledge of experts’ risk assessment.

 Cause-effect idiom: This cause connection can be determined
based on the following facts: Chronology of events in time;
Events occur in sequence; Productive, physical or intentional
relationship between cause and consequence; Rules for
determining causality couched in common sense.
 Measurement idiom: This idiom is used to model the
uncertainty of our own ability to observe accurately. For
example, the uncertainty of the testing accuracy is impacted
by actual defects and detected defects.

Normally, there are two methods to build a BBN: 1)
learning the network structure based on the given data set; and
2) constructing a network structure according to expert’s
experience [21]. In this paper, we adopt the second approach
due to two reasons: 1) Constructing network structure by
learning requires a lot of sample data and such data is hard to
be collected effectively and comprehensively; and 2) We
believe that the experts of many years’ experience can judge
the dependent/independent and direct/indirect relationships
between risk factors more effectively. In addition, a formal way
of building the BBN makes the process more explicit and
arguable, and improve the communication and understanding
among different experts while helping to reach to an agreement.

 Induction idiom: This idiom models the uncertainty related to
inductive reasoning (including historical experiences) based
on populations of similar or exchangeable members.
 Reconciliation idiom: This idiom reconciles independent
sources of evidence about a single attribute of a single entity,
where these sources of evidence have been produced by
different methods. Also, it combines uncertain definition
model with causal inference model and combines
information from different causal models.
For the NPTs definition, we use the historic statistical data
and the estimation of experts. For example, analysts can
identify the possible types of threats and calculate or estimate
their frequencies under the given environment. We firstly
identify all the concerned risk factors and add them into a
candidate pool, then identify their causal relationships
according to the five idioms along with the Risk Model, and
finally combine these causal fragments and build their NPTs to
finish the construction of the BBN. Figure 3 depicts the process
and the brief descriptions about each step are as follows:
Step 1. The target entity should be defined. The target node
presents our main purpose of the BBN, namely, to assess “the
risk of asset”.
Step 2. Identify risk components and relationships from
Risk Model which are relevant to the target entity. In our
example, the identified entities are ASSETS, MISSION
CRITICALITY,
THREATS,
VULNERABILITIES,
COUNTERMEASURES and the relationships are
INCREASE, EXPLOIT, MITIGATE, LEAD_TO, REDUCE,
DAMAGE, HAVE. Note that these extracted entities or
relationships may not be used in BBN directly. For example,
we
replace
COUNTERMEASURE
with
COUNTERMEASURE_EFFECTIVENESS because we
concern the effectiveness of countermeasures to mitigate the
vulnerabilities, not the costs of countermeasures. There are two
advantages by doing so. Firstly, it is for better understanding
and communication, secondly, it tells analysts on what aspects
(effectiveness or costs) of risk components they should
concentrate in the following steps.

Figure 3. The process of developing causal model

Step 3. Elicit risk factors based on identified risk
components in step 2. We elicit all risk factors which have
direct impact on each of the risk components. For example, we
can elicit that the effectiveness of countermeasure is impacted

For the causal relationships extraction, we use the method
suggested by Neil [29], proposed “building blocks” concepts,
using “idioms” to build causal dependency diagrams. Five
idioms are summarized as follows:
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introduce “connector entities” to connect them. For example,
we have to introduce the inherent vulnerability and residual
vulnerability to reflect the mitigation effectiveness after certain
countermeasures are applied. Also, after the new connector
entities are introduced, we should go back to step 4.

directly by its configuration and applicability. Based on the
extent that threat can exploit vulnerabilities, we can elicit
vulnerability exposure and ease of exploit. In our example, the
rest of elicited entities may be applicability of countermeasure,
configuration of countermeasure, vulnerability type, and
vulnerability ease of exploit, vulnerability exposure to public,
threat type, and threat frequency of occurrence.

Step 7. Evaluate obtained fragments. Once we get the
initial causal fragments, we should evaluate them based on the
needs and constraints within our domain. If the building block
(idiom) is not suitable, it should be revised. In our example,
though the “personal skills” and “training plan” have impacts
on correctness of countermeasures, but our current discussion
does not take much of practical operational details into account,
so we will discard these two entities at this moment.

Step 4. Continue to elicit risk factors based on the new risk
factors elicited in step 3. This step continues until we reach the
“leaf” risk factors where the probabilities are available (i.e.,
directly from the statistical data or experts’ direct estimation).
In our example, the complexity of countermeasure, usability of
countermeasure,
maintenance
of
countermeasure,
countermeasure type, personal skills, and training plan can be
elicited in this step.

Step 8. Combine obtained fragments. It is easy to notice
that some common entities are shared by different building
blocks, after each building block has been re-evaluated; we can
then combine them together based on these common entities. In
addition, there may be some causal relationships among the
risk factors in different fragments and they must be identified.
For example, we can identity that the “vulnerability type” has
impact both on “threat potential” and “countermeasure
applicability”. Since the BBN is a Directed Acyclic Graph, we
have to make sure that the composite model satisfies the
constraints of BBN. Finally, the structure of BBN is obtained.

Identify leaf risk factors for
CM_Configuration

CM_Usability

Personal skills

CM_Maintenance

Training plan

CM_Complextity

CM_Configuration

(c)

Identify risk factors for
CM_Configuration

CM_Configuration

Identify risk factors for
CM_Effectiveness

Step 9. For each entity, it must have a finite number of
mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive states. Different
entities may have different states or measurement scales. For
example, “threat potential” may have three states (High,
Medium, Low), while “countermeasure maintenance” may
have four states based on the cost (under $1000, $1000-$2000,
$2000-$3000, more than $3000). For simplicity, we assume
that all the entities (except the nodes ThreatType,
VulnerabilityType and CM_Type, their states are based on
their possible types in the given scenario) have three possible
states: High, Medium and Low. In real-world, we can use other
available practical measurement scale to improve the accuracy
and understanding of our assessment.

CM_Applicability

CM_Effectiveness

(b)

ResidualVulnerability

CM_Effectiveness

ThreatsPotential

MissionCriticality

RiskOfAsset
(a)

Figure 4. Identify (a) risk components related to target entity; (b) risk factors
related to risk components; (c) risk factors until to reach leaf risk factors.

Step 10. Based on the historic statistical data and
estimations from the experts, build the NPT for each entity. For
the leaf node, directly assign the probability to each state; for
non-leaf node, assign the probabilities to its states under all the
possible combinations of its parents’ states. Table I shows the
NPT of leaf node “CM_Complexity”.

Step 5. Build elementary causal building blocks (idioms).
We identify the entities from the candidate pool. We begin at
the root level (i.e., the risk components level), then to the leaf
risk factor level. Firstly, we identify risk components related to
our
target
entity,
namely,
“RiskOfAsset”,
so
“ThreatsPotential”, “MissionCriticality”, “Vulnerability”,
“CM_Effectiveness” can be identified, as shown in Figure 4
(a), then we identity risk factors for each of the parents in
previous step, for example, we identify the risk factors of
“CM_Applicability” and CM_Configuration” that are related
to “CM_Effectiveness”, as shown in Figure 4 (b), continue
this process until all the newly identified entities become leaf
risk factors. For example, we can indentify from the candidate
pool
that
“personal
skills”,
“CM_Complextity”,
“CM_Maintenance”, “CM_Usability” and “training plan”
have impacts on “CM_Configuration”, as shown in Figure 4
(c). Note that the causal fragments obtained here may be
modified in the following steps.

Table II shows the NPT of non-leaf node
“CM_Effectiveness”. When the whole process is finished, the
final BBN is constructed. The nodes in the BBN are causally
linked and the NPTs indicate the strength of these links. Our
final BBN is shown in Figure 5. Due to the limited space, the
entire NPTs are not shown in the paper.
C. Applying BBN into Operational Scenarios
In order to assess the risk of real software systems in a
socio-technical environment [33], we have used the operational
scenarios of the target system as “triggers” for the discovery of
applicable C&A requirements. After the relevant C&A
requirements are discovered, the risk components associated
with them can also be obtained.

Step 6. Sometimes the existing entities in the pool cannot
be grouped directly in a reasonable way, so we should
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TABLE I. NPT OF NODE CM_COMPLEXITY
Possible States

Probability

High

0.6

Medium

0.3

Low

0.1

TABLE II. NPT OF NODE CM_EFFECTIVENESS

Figure 5. The BBN for Risk Assessment

distributions over unbounded and possibly infinite numbers of
interrelated hypotheses [7].

The BBN we built in section IV.B, then can be used into
this scenario to assess the risk for the target assets. Risk
assessment based on operational scenarios has two main
advantages: 1) operational scenarios of the target system can be
easily obtained from domain experts and other artifacts (e.g.
use cases); and 2) assumptions about the coverage of the
assessment are already addressed in the development of the
scenario building process. In our previous research [16], we
have learned that each operational scenario is related to
multiple requirements. In this situation, we can assess the risk
for the asset in each related requirement, and then calculate its
risk as a whole by using appropriate aggregation methods (i.e.
weight average method).

MEBN logic represents the world as comprised of entities
that have attributes and are related to other entities. Random
variables (RVs) represent features of entities and relationships
among entities. Knowledge about attributes and relationships is
expressed as a collection of MEBN fragments (MFrags)
organized into MEBN Theories (MTheories) [24]. An MFrag
consists of RVs, a fragment graph, and a set of local
distributions. Each MFrag has an associated set of RVs that are
partitioned into context, input, and resident RVs. A variable in
an MFrag may have a list of arguments that are placeholders
for entities in the domain and makes MFrags parameterized.
The local probability distribution for resident RV is defined in
the MFrag itself, through a description function which specifies
how to assign probabilities to the given its parents. The
probability distribution for each input RV is defined in other
MFrag in which it acts as a resident node. Context RVs are
boolean nodes collectively specify conditions under which the
local distributions for the resident RVs apply.

It is notable that the BBN shown in Figure 5 is useful when
there is only one instance for each of the risk factors. However,
in a real-world scenario, we have to add more nodes to
represent each possible risk factor, but the numbers of threats,
countermeasures and vulnerabilities are all different from
scenario to scenario. Since it is impossible to build a BBN for
each scenario, the expected BBN should have the ability to
treat each instance of risk components individually, and
systematically aggregate their impacts later together. In the
next section, we will exploit the expressiveness and reasoning
power of MEBN logic to address this specific problem.

A generative MTheory summarizes statistical regularities
that characterize a domain and also introduces necessary
mechanism to ensure these MFrags collectively satisfies
consistency constraints and the existence of a unique joint
probability distribution over an unbounded, possibly infinite
number of instances of the RVs represented in each of the
MFrags within the set [7]. To apply a generative MTheory into
a specific scenario, we need to instantiate it with specific
information to form a Situation-Specific Bayesian Network
(SSBN). Then, standard Bayesian inference can be used on this
SSBN to answer query (e.g., what is the probability of target
asset to have a high risk level?), to refine the MTheory (e.g.,
each new evidence gives us additional statistical data to refine
the local distributions of the RVs), and to refine our underlying
PDO (e.g., the low applicability of the countermeasures can
promote experts to identify more effective applicable
countermeasures from the given requirements).

D. Modeling Risk Assessment with MEBN Logic
1) Overview of MEBN Logic
In the previous section, we discussed the limited
expressiveness of the standard BBN. Normally, BBN assumes
a simple attribute-value representation, that is, each problem
instance involves reasoning about the fixed number of
attributes, with only the evidence values changing from
problem instance to problem instance [7]. Thus standard BBNs
lack the expressive power to represent entity types (e.g., threat)
that can be instantiated dynamically, as many times as required
for the situations. MEBN is a good fit for this need with the
expressive power of first-order logic with a sound and logically
consistent treatment of uncertainty, which provides syntax, a
set of model construction and inference processes, and
semantics that together provide a means of defining probability

One of the important advantages of MEBN is its clarity and
modularity. This gives us a flexible and powerful way to build
our knowledge base for a specific domain.
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Context Node

IsA(Threat,e)

Input Node

3

<>(e)
Type(e)

IsA(Countermeasure,c)

IsA(Asset,e)

CM_Maintenance(c)
CM_Usabiility(c)

CM_ Complexity(c)

Resident Node

IsA(Countermeasure,e)

Legend

IsA(Vulnerability,e)

Entity Type MFrag
CM_Configuration(c)

IsA(Vulnerability,v)

4

Countermeasures Configuation MFrag

IsA(Countermeasure,c)

5

v=CanBeMitigatedBy(c)

6
IsA(Vulnerability,v)

CM_Type(c)

IsA(Vulnerability,v)

VulnerabilityType(v)

IsA(Countermeasure,c)

v=CanBeMitigatedBy(c)

ExplosureToPublic(v)
CM_Configuration(c)
CM_Applicability(c,v)

VulnerabilityType(v)

CM_Effectiveness(c,v)

IsA(Threat,t)

IsA(Vulnerability,v)

7
VulnerabilityType(v)

Residual Vulnerability MFrag

IsA(Vulnerability,v)

IsA(Threat,t)

v=CanBeExploitedBy(t)

8

ThreatFreqence(t)

ThreatPoten(t,v)

IsA(Asset,a)

Inherent_Vulnerability(v)

Residual_Vulnerability(v)

Inherent Vulnerability MFrag

v=CanBeExploitedBy(t)

ThreatType(t)

Threat Potential MFrag

CM_Effectiveness(c,v)

EaseOfExploit(v)

Inherent_Vulnerability(v)

Countermeasures Effectiveness MFrag

Mission_Criticality(a)

distribution [Hi,Me,Lo]=function{
for v in parents(Inherent_Vulnerability(v)) {
if (Vi->c) {
if(ExplosureToPublic(Vi))==Hi && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Lo) then
[Hi:0.35,Me:0.5,Lo:0.15];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Hi && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Me) then
[Hi:45,Me:25,Lo:3];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Lo && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Hi) then
[Hi:0.2,Me:0.4,Lo:0.4];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Lo && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Me) then
[Hi:0.1,Me:0.3,Lo:0.6];
else if (ExplosureToPublic(Vi)==Me && EaseOfExploit(Vi)==Me) then
case VulnerabilityType(v)){
Software:[Hi:0.4,Me:0.25,Lo:0.35];
Network:[Hi:0.2,Me:0.3,Lo:0.5];
Others:[Hi:0.1,Me:0.1,Lo:0.8];
}
else [Lo:15,Me:30,Hi:55];
(5) in Figure 6
}}}

Residual_Vulnerability(v)

Threats_Potential(t,v)

RiskOfAsset(a)
Risk of Asset Assessment MFrag

Figure 8. Local Distribution for
Inherent_Vulnerability(v)
distribution [Hi,Me,Lo]=function{
(6) in Figure 6
for c,v in parents(Residual_Vulnerability(v)) {
if any(Ci->c) {
if Inherent_Vulnerability(v)==Hi then
[Hi: 1-min(1:(0.8*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Hi))+
(0.6*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Me))+
(0.4*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Lo)),
Me:(1-Hi)*0.6, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.4]
else if Inherent_Vulnerability(v)==Me then
[Hi: 0.6-min(0.6:(0.8*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Hi))+
(0.6*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Me))+
(0.4*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Lo)),
Me:(1-Hi)*0.8, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.2]
else if Inherent_Vulnerability(v)==Lo then
[Hi: 0.2-min(0.2:(0.8*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Hi))+
(0.6*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Me))+
(0.4*number(Ci,have(CM_effectiveness(Ci)==Lo)),
Me:(1-Hi)*0.2, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.8]
}} }

Figure 9. Local Distribution for
Residual_Vulnerability(v)

Figure 6. A Generative MTheory for Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model

In addition, new MFrags can be added into MTheory
without impacting existing ones, as long as these MFrags
together satisfy the constraints (existence of a unique joint
probability distribution) of the MTheory. Although other
modeling techniques are also attractive, they are less suitable in
the domain of risk assessment. As an example, OOBN provides
a natural way to represent uncertainty about the attributes of
instances of different types of objects (risk factor), but the
problem of OOBN is that the instances of a same object have
not only the same structure but also the same probability
distribution. In real risk assessment process, the probability
distribution of instances of the same object may have a big
difference. For instance, if we have an object of “Threat
Mitigates Vulnerability”, two instances can be “Threat T1
mitigates Vulnerability V” and “Threat T2 mitigates
Vulnerability V”, obviously, T1 and T2 may have totally
different effect on vulnerability V, and thus we should assign
different probability distribution to these two different threats
instances. On the contrary, MEBN can easily represent this
situation.

Local distributions in standard BBNs are typically
represented by static tables (NPTs), which limit each node to a
fixed number of parents, while an instance of a RV in an
MTheory might have any number of parents, because its
parents are also RVs and can be instantiated as many times as
necessary. We use pseudo-code suggested in [7] to convey the
idea of using local distributions to specify probability
distributions. It is possible that different people have different
local distribution functions for the same RV.
distribution [Software,Network,Others]=function{
for v in VulnerabilityType(v)){
if (Vi->v) then [Software:0.4,Network:0.2,Others:0.2];
}}

Figure 7. Local Distribution for VulnerabilityType(v)

Leaf RV has no parents and its distribution is assigned
directly. Figure 7 gives an example to define the local
distribution for leaf RV VulnerabilityType(v). For any given
vulnerability, the probability of vulnerability type to be
“Software”, “Network”, “Others” is 0.4, 0.2, and 0.2,
respectively. The vulnerability types and their probabilities can
be different in a specific environment.

2) Building MEBN Model for Risk Assessment
Based on the BBN shown in Figure 5, we can extract
relevant MFrags, then we can collect these MFrags to form an
MTheory. Figure 6 shows an example of generative MTheory.
The first MFrag is the Entity Type MFrag which is used to
formally declare the possible types of entities in the model.
Other MFrags are used to model the risk factors and their
causal relationships.

Figure 8 defines the local distribution for RV
Inherent_Vulnerability(v). This variable has its parents but
they share the same ordinary variable. Thus, for each instance
of Initial_Vulnerability(v), it has fixed number of parents,
namely, the three instances of VulnerabilityType(v),
ExplosureToPublic(v) and EaseofExploit(v). The same way
to build the NPTs for nodes in the standard BBNs, we use
description function to assign the probabilities covering all of
the possible combinations of its parents.

MEBN uses an expressive language to define the
probability distributions for RVs. Due to the limited space, we
only give the local distribution functions for the RVs
VulnerabilityType(v),
Initial_Vulnerability(v)
and
Residual_Vulnerability(v), other local distribution functions
and the default distributions are not shown here.

Figure 9 defines the local distribution for RV
Residual_Vulnerability(v). This variable has parents and there
is one external variable c in its parent CM_Effectiveness(c,v).
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In this situation, the instances of CM_Effectiveness(c,v)
depend on the number of countermeasures which can mitigate
this vulnerability in the given scenario, therefore, we must take
the number of countermeasures into account. For example, as
shown in Figure 10, if there are two countermeasures !C0
(entity identifier, begins with an exclamation point, represent
an instance of an entity) and !C1 can mitigate the
vulnerability !V. When the Inherent_Vulnerability(!V) is High,
the
CM_Effectiveness(!C0,!V)
is
High
and
CM_Effectiveness(!C1,!V) is Medium, we can identify the
number of countermeasure with High, Medium, Low
effectiveness are 1, 1, 0, respectively. According to the local
distribution described in Figure 9, the final probability
distribution for Residual_Vulnerability(!V) will be [Hi:1min(1:(0.8*1+0.6*1+0.4*0)), Me:(1-Hi)*0.6, Lo:(1-Hi)*0.4],
namely, [Hi:0,Me:0.6,Lo:0.4] as shown in Figure 10.

“When there is a threat DDoS can_exploit the Software
vulnerability while suggested countermeasure type is
Network with low complexity, high usability and medium
maintenance, what is the risk of asset A?” Or “what is the
countermeasure applicability of C?”.
TABLE III. THE MAPPING BETWEEN RISK MODEL AND MTHEORY
(Requirements and Risk Model ) => (Generative MTheory)
(Security Requirements and Assets, Security Requirements suggest Countermeasures,
Security Requirements prevent Vulnerabilities, Security Requirements driven by
Threats, Countermeasures have Vulnerabilities, Security Requirements apply to
Assets) => (The operational scenario under which the risk components are discovered
and the MTheory applied to assess the risk of the given assets)
(Threats) => (Threat_Potential(t,v), and Threat Potential MFrag)
(Vulnerabilities) => (Inherentl_Vulnerability(v), Inherent Vulnerability MFrag and
Residual_Vulnerability(v), Residual Vulnerability MFrag)
(Countermeasures) => (CM_Effectiveness(cm,v))

By modeling risk assessment using MEBN logic, each risk
factor is represented by a corresponding RV which can be
instantiated dynamically as many times as necessary, so all the
risk factors in the given scenario can be treated at the instance
level. In addition, MEBN logic provides a consistent, flexible
way to define the local probabilities for the RVs. Through this
way, different group stakeholders will have a clear common
understanding about how the original information is collected,
how these information are combined or integrated, how these
information are transformed from one node to other nodes and
how these information are used to support or deny an argument
from the risk assessment. The risk components and causal
relationships in the Risk Model have their corresponding
matches in the MTheory. Other relationships become the
foundation or context of the operational scenario under which
the MTheory is applied. Therefore, we can assume that the
MTheory is consistent with the Requirements and Risk Model
in our discourse of domain. The complete mappings between
Risk Model and MTheory are shown in Table III.

(Risks) => (RiskOfAsset(a))
(Mission Criticality) => (Mission_Criticality(a))
(Threat Exploit Vulnerabilities, Threats increase risks, Threats damage assets, Assets
have mission criticality, Vulnerabilities lead to risks) => (Risk of Asset Assessment
MFrag)
(Countermeasures mitigate Vulnerabilities) => (Residual Vulnerability MFrag)
(Countermeasures reduce risks) => (Ignored since the countermeasures reduce the
risks by mitigating the vulnerabilities)

Simple sensitivity analysis and comparison can be done
based on Figure 11 to support the decision making process. For
example, in order to reduce the risk of A, we can either
improve the maintenance of countermeasure or apply a new
countermeasure. So we can fix other conditions and only
change the CM_Maintenance(!C) from High to Low, we can
get corresponding results of RiskOfAsset(!A), as shown in
Table IV. Similarly, we can check CM_Type(!C) and make
another table, as shown in Table V. Therefore, we can find out
that changing the countermeasure type is more cost-effective
than improving the maintenance of countermeasure. These
types of sensitivity analysis and comparisons can be used to
support the complex decision-making and help finding the
“best” solution to reduce the risk of target asset.

3) Inference by using MEBN model for Risk Assessment
The generative MTheory must be instantiated into an SSBN
to compute the response to a query under the given scenario.
Although the generative MTheory in Figure 6 implicitly
represents infinite possible operational scenarios in our domain,
we take the simplest one, namely, there is only one instance for
each type risk component, to demonstrate how it can be used in
a real risk assessment. Figure 11 illustrates a SSBN instantiated
from the generative MTheory. We assume the instances of risk
components in this simplest scenario are asset !A(ENCLAVE),
threat !T(UNAUTHORIZED INTERNET ACCESS),
vulnerability
!V(FIREWALL
AND
IDS
MISCONFIGURATION),
countermeasure
!C(INSTALL
FIREWALLS & IDS AT KEY POINTS IN THE ENCLAVE
WITH APPROPRIATE CONFIGURATIONS), These
scenario specific information is used to instantiate the MTheory
and create instances of RVs. The details of the algorithm and
processes of how to construct SSBN are in [7] [24].

MEBN can be instantiated in a systematic way and the final
SSBN can be generated automatically. For example, some risk
factors have multiple instances and the risk assessment scenario
can be described as follows: The target asset !A0 (ENCLAVE)
may be damaged by threats !T0 (UNAUTHORIZED
INTERNET ACCESS) and !T1 (UNAUTHORIZED
NETWORK
TRAFFIC)
which
may
exploit
the
vulnerabilities
!V0
(INTERNET
ACCESS
NOT
PROXIED), !V1
(FIREWALL
AND
IDS
MISCONFIGURATION) and !V2 (USE OF TAMPERED
SOFTWARE), to mitigate the vulnerabilities, the suggested
countermeasure are !C0 (INSTALL FIREWALLS & IDS AT
KEY POINTS IN THE ENCLAVE WITH APPROPRIATE
CONFIGURATIONS) and !C1(MANAGED INTERNET
ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (DMZ)). Based on the above
information, the generative MTheory can be instantiated to a
new SSBN (top of Figure 12) that has relevant RVs and
MFrags instantiated multiple times. The bottom of Figure 12
shows a subset (the shadowed part) of the SSBN shown in the
top of Figure 12.

After the SSBN has been constructed, it can be treated as a
standard BBN. When a query (which contains a finding set of
particular information about the situation and a target set of the
nodes of interests) comes into SSBN, the inference works the
same way as a standard BBN to calculate the response for input
query. For example, Figure 11 can answer a set of query:
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Figure 10. Example of local
distribution calculation
The process of inference in MEBN Model
for Risk Assessment:
 Specify the operational scenario, identify
the relevant risk components.
 Based on the information in the given
operational scenario, construct the SSBN
by creating and combining instances of
the MFrags in the generative MTheory.
 Create query and apply standard
Bayesian network inference algorithm in
SSBN
 Answering the query by inspecting the
posterior probabilities of the target
nodes.

Figure 11. SSBN for the simplest risk assessment scenario

TABLE IV. NPT OF NODE
CM_MAINTENANCE
CM_Mainte

RiskOf

nance(!C)

Cost

Asset(!A)

High

$1000

[0.4,0.2,0.4]

Medium

$500

[0.5,0.2,0.3]

Low

$200

[0.6,0.2,0.2]

TABLE V. NPT OF NODE CM_TYPE
CM_

Figure 12. Generated SSBN for the simple risk assessment scenario (Top) + Details of the subset of SSBN (Bottom)
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RiskOf

Type
(!C)

Cost
Asset(!A)

Network

$1000

[0.1,0.2,0.7]

Software

$500

[0.4,0.3,0.3]

Others

$200

[0.6,0.2,0.2]

This subset contains two MFrags, “Threat Potential
MFrag” and “Risk of Asset MFrag”. Based on the given
operational scenario and the constraints of the context node
such as v=CanBeExploitedBy(t), assume that threat !T0 can
only exploit vulnerability !V0, whilst !T1 can exploit
vulnerabilities !V0, !V1 and !V2 to represent the risk level of
asset !A0, use (!T0 and !V0), (!T1 and !V0), (!T1 and !V1),
(!T1 and !V2) to instantiate the RVs and two MFrags, then we
will get one instance of Mission_Criticality(a) and
RiskOfAsset(a), two instances of Threat_Type(t) and
Threat_Frequence(t),
three
instances
of
Vulnerability_Type(v) and Residual_Vulnerability(v), and
four instances of Threat_Potential(t,v). Since the number of
risk factors in real-world risk assessment case can be huge, this
paper uses the open source software, UnBBayes tool [4], to
compute with MEBN models.
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V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduce the use of BBNs and MEBN
logic to overcome the limited expressiveness and model the
process of risk assessment and analyze the correlations among
different risk components. This paper presents a step-by-step
approach to indentify the risk related factors based on the Risk
Model and build a causal model for the probabilistic risk
assessment. By using MEBN logic, we build a generative
MTheory for risk assessment which implicitly represents
infinite possible operational scenarios in the domain of risk
assessment. The generative MTheory for Risk Assessment can
be instantiated by using the specific information in the given
operational scenario; therefore our model can treat each
individual instance of risk components dynamically and
process automatically. Our current model is based on a simple
operational scenario and there is an implicit assumption in our
model, that the relevant risk components are completely
discovered via security requirements. But in a real-world
situation, it is highly possible that the risk components may not
be fully discovered. Therefore, it is very important to take
advantage of the known explorative study on the types of
threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures for different kinds
of platforms and situations. We plan to apply our models and
methods into more complex operational scenarios which
contain multiple correlated requirements from different level of
abstractions, with the extension of the models to support the
temporal recursion. We will also develop a well-designed case
study to experiment and validate our Probabilistic Risk
Assessment Model.
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